Does the Nation Follow Nationalism or Does Nationalism Follow the Nation?

by Alberto Di Felice

September 2007

The question posed in the title juxtaposes an abstract concept, that of nation, with its concrete realization through political action. A simple linguistic analysis of the term “nationalism” highlights its duplicity. On the one hand, its suffix signifies that it is “the action or result” of something that is assumed to precede it logically—that is, the nation. On the other, like all “isms,” it refers to “a set of ideas or system of beliefs or behavior.” It is not coincidental that the nation itself can be roughly described by this very definition, among others, as a set of idealized relationships based on “the same language, culture and history.” [1] The question intentionally reverses the positions of what are supposed to be the “result” and its source, letting it be inferred that the relationship between the two is all but univocal. In fact, as this essay will try to argue, they may as well be the same thing.
The idea of nation involves “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself.” [2] According to this definition, the nation can be conceived as the highest form of social unity asserting its right to self-determination. Similarly, nationalism is “the desire by a group of people who share the same race, culture, language, etc. to form an independent country.” [3] It follows that the nation and nationalism become coterminous with, and require as their final stage, the nation-state (an independent country built on a national basis) as a political entity through which the nation can express its will. In the words of Hans Kohn:

As long as a nationality is not able to attain this consummation, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organization which, however, always tends at a given moment, the moment of “liberation,” to develop into a sovereign state. Nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the nation-state strengthens nationalism. [4]

The foregoing gives the idea of the three terms being Russian dolls that fit inside each other without any contradiction. This can create problems. It will be sufficient to remark that the nation-state is not an equivalent word for “state,” the latter being only a reference to the political institution which currently constitutes the most relevant structure of political representation. As such, the concept of state makes no reference to the elements embodied by the nation.
There appears to be a process through which human beings have come to perceive themselves within increasingly larger groups through the course of history. From the basic, fundamental family unit to what we have identified as the highest existing social structure—the nation. What relates these different forms of communion is their subjective, psychological nature. They proceed from and take place in a person’s mind rather than the external world, according to the representation of reality that each one has. The level of mental abstraction becomes higher as we proceed away from the smallest forms of human organization, where close contacts between members of a community are still possible, toward broader communities where contacts between all members become rarer or even impossible. Anderson’s definition of the nation as an “imagined community” captures this very point. [5]
The relationship that exists between an individual and a group can have its constitutive parts in a variety of ingredients whose aggregate nature and force of attraction often escape definition. Clifford Geertz identifies a series of distinct and occasionally overlapping elements which he calls “primordial loyalties.” These are “an attachment that stems from the subject’s, not the observer’s, sense of the ‘givens’ of social existence—speaking a particular language, following a particular religion, being born into a particular family, emerging out of a particular history, living in a particular place.” [6] Elements such as language and religion are easily recognizable by outsiders as being existent in reality. It is on them that categorization most often relies when defining the nation. What matters, however, is not their factual existence as much as the role they play in the psychology of those comprised in the community.
Anthony Smith makes a distinction between “ethnic categories” and “ethnic communities.” The former describe ethnic ties signified by factors such as language or religion. It is only when these factors instill a consciousness of being “a separate cultural and historical grouping” that an ethnic community comes into existence. [7] In his own words:

It is only when we come to the varying elements of a common culture that differentiate one population from another that more objective attributes enter the picture. … It is only when such markers are endowed with diacritical significance that these cultural attributes come to be seen as objective, at least as far as ethnic boundaries are concerned. [8]

It can be said that this moment ideally marks the birth of a nation. A community, therefore, comes to life as a nation when an external relationship with another community is made evident to its own members. A nation is born when it discovers its “ethnic boundaries.” [9] It is at this point that its more or less tangible characteristics become tightly intermingled with myths of a common ancestry. Individuals in the community think of the characteristic traits—real or imagined—of their group as an original creation propagated through time, as traditions inherited from their antecedents. In many cases this sense of belonging can be identified predominantly with one of the community’s prominent attributes—e.g., the French language for Québécois Canadians, or the Catholic faith for the Irish in the Republic of Ireland. However, the nature of the bond between the people forming the community cannot so readily be illustrated.
Our discussion so far has highlighted that the definition of nation cannot rely on any objective elements. There are features which from time to time can be used to facilitate processes of self-identification, but none of these features—singularly or in combination—constitute the nation. The formation of the nation is a highly subjective process, reacting to suggestions and influences which have their origin in a somewhat mythical dimension. The nation is the subjective belief of members of a particular social group of being a unique entity with common origins and, most importantly, a common destiny.
This definition opens a myriad of questions and possibilities, rather than providing answers. If the nation were a totally subjective phenomenon, it would be possible to infer that any human group can be made into a nation—and, consequently, into an autonomous nation-state. Indeed, if any group can define itself as a nation, even on the basis of fictitious attributes, and if “nationalism demands the nation-state,” then the potential for secessionism would be endless as no finite number of possible actors can be foreseen. The only force standing in the way of this incremental progression from one nation-state to the next is self-perception, the capacity of individuals to set a process of national self-recognition into motion.
As we have seen, the nation can be described as an “imagined community” which builds upon an idealized version of its self. However, one must be cautious to conclude that this psychological process is based solely on fabricated evidence or even outright lies.
It would be misleading to dismiss out of hand nationalistic sentiments as an effect of purely opportunistic or economically-driven behavior. To do so would put too much emphasis on the tangible aspects of nations. Social and economic disparities or cost-benefit analyses can be used in a number of different fields to study human behavior, but in some way they fail to fully capture the complexity and the specific nature of the ethnic nation. Elitist and materialist-instrumental explanations seem to reduce individuals to passive empty vessels responsive only to propaganda or economic calculations. They fail to explain how the ethnic nation can mobilize individual loyalties even when rational economic calculations predict losses in terms of resources and life standards. [10]
The explosion of ethnic nationalism and its power to mobilize masses can be explained by the conjunction of two elements: the ethnic nation as the fundamental political unit and the principle of self-determination as the foundation of political legitimacy. It is their coincidence which ignites ethnic nationalism.
As already noted, the emergence of a sense of national belonging and identification is observed as contacts between different groups start to develop. Such contacts allow individuals to mark the difference between members of their own community and outsiders. But the self-recognition of a social group cannot yield political mobilization if it is not linked to the idea of self-rule which is embodied by contemporary states. Since the religious community of Christianity and sacral dynastic monarchies have come to disappear, political power (i.e., the state) has found its new source of legitimacy as the representative of the people (i.e., the nation). [11] It is not by chance that “nation” has erroneously become a substitute for “state.” In reality, a state does not necessarily have to coincide with a nation: France, for example, is clearly not an instance of an ethnic nation. Yet, states become identified in relation to an ethnic, nationalistic base. Even states that call themselves “civic” will eventually look for an ex-post nationalistic justification for existing.
The ethnic myth as a foundation stone can be investigated and deconstructed, but its binding force cannot be completely explained or quantified. It is certainly possible to establish the identities of the social groups that promote it, the underlying interests, but all this cannot reveal what impels individuals to participate in this belief to the point of even killing or dying for it. This is because of the fact, already remarked upon, that the ultimate factor shaping the sense of national belonging is intrinsically emotional. It finds its basis in external attributes—truths, half-truths or fictions—serving to identify the core character of the nation, but ultimately the exact meaning of that relationship is unlikely to be conveyed by any of these attributes in themselves.
At this point, we may return to the question raised in the title. As our discussion has tried to show, the three Russian dolls represented by the nation, nationalism and the nation-state all share a common ground. More than their mutual reliance on the external elements (e.g., language and religion) embodied by the idea of nation, the myths of common ancestry that support them, this is the struggle for a political end goal, a project for the future: the autonomy of the group, however defined. If so, all three terms have an inherently political nature, in that they necessarily involve the formation of an autonomous representative institution.
From this standpoint, asking if it is the nation or nationalism that comes first is the same as asking the old egg and chicken question. What the question is really asking, perhaps, is why the nation and nationalism create a sense of solidarity. The difficulty in answering this question usually leads to describe how this solidarity manifests itself, notably by tracing it to visible cultural attributes, most often to unveil their lack of substance. Nationalism, it is argued, is based on something that does not exist: ethnic origin is a fiction, nations and nation-states are a social construction, states fabricate a self-serving mythology that can furnish corroborating evidence for their existence through feelings of common descent. But since it is not the actual existence of the attributes so much as the fact that individuals perceive them as true that gives form to the nation and drives nationalism, this endeavor—while important—proves ineffective. We can dissect these processes and show how they work, but their real origin escapes us. This is perhaps a recognition of the impossibility of explaining the deeply existential nature of national sentiments.
Carl Schmitt identified the concept of the political in the distinction between “friend” and “enemy.” [12] For Schmitt, this definition does not describe the political in its temporary content, but rather provides a scheme which can—but does not necessarily have to—be complemented by other independent criteria (e.g., economic or religious) according to the specific situation. It is only when these criteria are perceived in antagonism with an enemy that they acquire political status.

The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation, It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy [is] the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. … Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participant is in the position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence. [13]

Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy. [14]

These words seem to apply perfectly to the political phenomenon called nation. Even though language and religion can shape propaganda and economic calculations enter into play, what ultimately drives behavior is the subconscious, existential sense of “association” and “dissociation” which underlies them. Its origins—the origins of both the nation and nationalism—are real in that they are perceived as such. They are neither totally primordial nor totally constructed.  The line between mental and factual reality blurs up to the point where it fades away. Maybe, most importantly, that line never existed because, as Anderson put it, “all communities … are imagined.” [15] In the words of Sir Ernest Barker:

The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things which are simply “there” that matter in human life. What really and finally matters is the thing that is apprehended as an idea, and, as an idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an ideal as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force. [16]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

Friedrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston, MA: Little–Brown, 1969).

Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Steve Fenton, Ethnicity (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2003).

Carwyn Fowler, A Durable Concept: Anthony Smith’s Concept of “National Identity” and the Case of Wales, PSA 52nd Annual Conference: “Making Politics Count,” University of Aberdeen, April 5–7, 2002, available at http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2002/fowler.pdf.

Clifford Geertz, Primordial Loyalties and Standing Identities: Anthropological Reflections on the Politics of Identity, Public lecture delivered at Collegium Budapest, Budapest, December 13, 1993, available at http://www.colbud.hu/main_old/PubArchive/PL/PL07-Geertz.pdf.

Carl Schmitt, trans. by George Schwab, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2007).

Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991).

Peter Ravn Rasmussen, “‘Nations’ or ‘States’: An Attempt at Definition,” http://www.scholiast.org/nations/whatisanation.html, accessed August 31, 2007.

“The Politics of Devolution: What Makes a Nation, a State or a Nation-State?,” in Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?, http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/mod/resource/view.php?id=177035, accessed August 31, 2007.

NOTES

1. These definitions are taken from Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Seventh Edition (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2005). [↩]
2. Montserrat Guibernau, cited in “The Politics of Devolution.” [↩]
3. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English. [↩]
4. Cited in Fowler, A Durable Concept, p. 2. [↩]
5. See Anderson, Imagined Communities. [↩]
6. Geertz, Primordial Loyalties and Standing Identities, p. 6. [↩]
7. See Smith, National Identity, pp. 20–1. [↩]
8. Ibid., p. 23. [↩]
9. See Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. [↩]
10. See Connor, Ethnonationalism, chap. 6. [↩]
11. See Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 9–22. [↩]
12. See Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. [↩]
13. Ibid., pp. 26–7. [↩]
14. Ibid., p. 37. [↩]
15. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6. [↩]
16. Cited in Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 4. [↩]