David Weinberg has written about cinema and Nazism: “Paradoxically, the medium which so masterfully creates timeless illusion and fantasy may well prove to be an indispensable tool for understanding one of the most frightening realities of modern history.” This essay will explore the connection between Nazism and film propaganda during the Third Reich. It will show how the evolution of film production during the Nazi regime highlights a strong link with previous cinematic tradition, most notably in the case of narrative cinema. It will be argued that such continuity accounts for Nazism’s difficult self-definition due to its ambivalent relationship with modern culture.

The great Lord Acton once wrote that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” His famous dictum seems to apply perfectly to the People’s Republic of China, where the monopoly power of the Communist Party on politics to this day is accompanied by rampant corruption.

One of the underlying tendencies in contemporary culture—a tendency indeed of great age—is the desire to refashion what sociologist Jacques Rancière called “the dominant fiction,” the body of ideas reflecting social needs and aspirations, the “image of social consensus” which allows individuals to represent themselves in order to get a grasp of who and where they are in the world.

The reviewed articles focus on China’s long-range strategic orientation and military posture.

In the post-Cold War era, China is arguably the potentially most destabilizing actor in world politics. Certainly, it is the most dynamic force in terms of economic growth and a political power in the Far East. The rising giant is a source of concern for the international community, and especially for the other dominant actors in the Asia-Pacific region—notably, the U.S. and Japan.

The question posed in the title juxtaposes an abstract concept, that of nation, with its concrete realization through political action. A simple linguistic analysis of the term “nationalism” highlights its duplicity. On the one hand, its suffix signifies that it is “the action or result” of something that is assumed to precede it logically—that is, the nation. On the other, like all “isms,” it refers to “a set of ideas or system of beliefs or behavior.” It is not coincidental that the nation itself can be roughly described by this very definition, among others, as a set of idealized relationships based on “the same language, culture and history.”

The quantity theory of money relates changes in the quantity of money to changes in the price levels. It holds that any change in the supply of money reflects variations in the general level of prices—that is, the purchasing power of money. In consequence, prices will tend to change proportionately with the quantity of money in circulation. Put succintly, the quantity theory of money states that inflation or deflation can be controlled by altering the quantity of money in circulation inversely with the level of prices.

According to Jean-Pierre Chevènement, M. Monnet’s fault was, put crudely, to turn the concept of nation into a demon: “By confusing nations with nationalism, he rejects them viscerally, beginning with his own, but with the exception of the American nation-continent, the only one he judges in tune with the times.”

The major change in the new text of the Merger Regulation involves the role of the so-called “dominance test.” The previous version of the regulation required proof of dominance before the impact of a merger on the relevant market could be further assessed. Article 2(3) prohibited “a concentration … which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it is significantly impeded.” In the light of a judgment by the American Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission decided to adopt a new standard that could allow intervention even if a dominant position was not created.

Governance carries with it a wide range of positive connotations. They are mainly attributed to the fact that political decisions are not an expression of hierarchy but are based on “reflexive self-organization.” The implicit core meaning underlying the concept is that governance significantly lessens the authority of national governments—i.e. states. Governance, in the current acceptation of the term, means “governance without government.” This paper aims to test for this premise by looking at how the institutional arrangement of the EU allows for non-state interest representation through the legislative process. It is argued that the government/governance dichotomy is to a large extent fictitious, and that states still manage to preserve the bulk of authority thanks to Europe’s prevailing style of government: consociational accord.